Contracts by Reardon, Patrick A.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 3 Article 3 
Winter 12-1-1976 
Contracts 
Patrick A. Reardon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Patrick A. Reardon, Contracts, 28 S. C. L. Rev. 271 (1976). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
CONTRACTS
I. COMMERCIAL PROPERTY LEASES
In E & S Inv. Co. v. Richland Bowl, Inc.,' plaintiff (E & S)
sued on a 20-year commercial lease on a building it owned in
Columbia, South Carolina. Richland Bowl was the lessee and
United Bowling Centers, Inc. (United) was guarantor of the les-
see. The lease contemplated Richland Bowl's use of the building
as a bowling center for the entire 20-year term. The lessee, how-
ever, developed problems with its operation, and the lease was
twice assigned to other tenants. All parties consented to these
assignments; however, the assignments stipulated that Richland
Bowl and United remained untimately liable upon default by the
assignees.
In 1969, the last assignee vacated the premises after contin-
ued arrearage in the rental payments. E & S then re-entered the
property and on June 15, 1970, signed a superceding 10-year lease
with TG&Y Stores. This lease stipulated that E & S would bear
the costs, up to $50,000, of converting the structure from a bowl-
ing center to a retail store. The actual costs incurred were $49,200.
TG&Y moved into the building on November 26, 1970.
Meanwhile an action to collect on the rent deficiencies was
brought by E & S against Richland Bowl and United in 1969 in
the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County. The case was
referred to the Master in Equity who found for the plaintiff,
E & S, and entered damages of $36,034.52 against the defendant.
The Circuit Judge affirmed the Master's finding of liability on the
part of Richland Bowl and United, but reversed the Master's
finding that the TG&Y lease was more valuable to E & S than the
Richland Bowl lease. Past damages of $70,103.15 and future dam-
ages of $39,844.05 (discounted to present value) were found by the
Circuit Judge. Appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court fol-
lowed.
2
The supreme court affirmed the finding of the defendants'
liability on the lease.3 Most of the majority opinion, and all of the
1. 264 S.C. 582, 216 S.E.2d 522 (1975).
2. Id. at 586-97, 216 S.E.2d at 523-28.
3. The appellants excepted to their liability on the basis that E & S's own acts
breached the lease. In addition exception was made to a factual ruling below that appel-
lant United had not offered to perform the lease after default by the assignees. It was
1
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dissent by Justice Bussey, was spent with the "most complex"
issue of damages.
The original lease between E & S and Richland Bowl stipu-
lated an annual rent of $35,200. In addition the lessee covenanted
to maintain the building and perform other duties. The TG&Y
lease stipulated an annual rent of $42,542.88, but, because E & S
now had to perform duties previously placed upon Richland
Bowl, the earlier lessee, the court found that the new lease had a
value of $36,091.30 to E & S. Both the majority and dissenting
opinions generally agreed with the above valuation. Divergence
between the two opinions arose over how to deal with the $49,200
in modifications made by E & S.
The original lease stipulated that damages recoverable upon
a default by the lessee would be the difference between the total
rent due, including future rents, and the amount "realized" upon
a reletting to third parties.4 The majority held that E & S could
recover the $49,200 expended on modification as damages arising
out of Richland Bowl's breach. The court, however, limited
E & S's recovery to the difference between the cost of the modifi-
cations and their value beyond 1981. In other words, the court
said that only those costs which were attributable to the breach
of Richland Bowl could be recovered and that any value the modi-
fications retained at the end of the original lease period were not
damages arising out of the breach.5 The court remanded the case
for a determination of the value the modifications would have in
1981. No future damages would arise as the majority found the
TG&Y annual rent to be greater than the rent stipulated under
the original Richland Bowl lease.'
alleged that E & S refused this offer. Finally the appellants urged that E & S's failure to
forward part of an assignee's rent payment to Richland Bowl constituted conversion of the
funds. Part of the assignee's rent payments were to be a refund over the life of the lease
of the lessee's security deposit. All exceptions, however, were overruled.
4. 264 S.C. at 590, 216 S.E.2d at 526. The court noted that it could find no satisfac-
tory definition of "realize", including that definition found in cases applying the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. While the Code sections addressing realization of income, Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, §§ 1001-1002, may not have been of value to the court, the applicable Code
sections show that the tax laws would treat the facts of this case in the manner the
majority did. Le., the $49,200 modification costs would be capitalized, id. § 263, and gross
income, id. § 61(a)(5) would be reduced by the amount of depreciation attributable to that
year, id. § 167. Also the additional expenses borne by E & S under the TG&Y lease would
be ordinary and necessary business expenses. Id. § 162.
5. The court was careful to refrain from referring to "permanent" improvements,
noting that some improvements may have a value beyond 1981, although they are not
"permanent" in a true sense. 264 S.C. at 591-92, 216 S.E.2d at 526-27.
6. Id. The TG&Y lease was found to have a value of $36,091.30 to E & S while the
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In dissenting, Justice Bussey rejected this view and instead
looked upon the $49,200 expenditure on modifications as a trans-
action between E & S and TG&Y separate from the original lease.
He would have affirmed the trial judge's finding that $6,500 of the
rent paid by TG&Y was a 13% annual return on the $49,200
expenditure by E & S. Therefore, reducing the rent paid by
TG&Y by this $6,500 and the value of the extra duties assumed
by the lessor produced a fair market rental value of the property
as vacated by Richland Bowl of $29,601.30 per annum or
$5,598.70 less than was stipulated in the original lease. In other
words, the dissent would have ignored the post-breach modifica-
tion costs and instead would have measured the damages as being
the amount by which the rent stipulated in the lease exceeded the
property's fair market rental value at the time of the breach.
Accordingly, the trial judge and Justice Bussey would have en-
tered future damages against the defendant of $39,844.05, dis-
counted to present value.7
The measure of damages recoverable for a tenant's failure to
pay rent has been stated on numerous occasions.
It is the rule in South Carolina that when a lessee declines to
perform his contract, a cause of action immediately arises in
favor of the lessor for full damages, present and prospective,
which were the necessary and direct result of the breach; and
the measure of damages is the difference between the rent fixed
in the lease and the rental value of the premises for the entire
term at the time of the breach, together with such special dam-
ages as may have resulted from the breach.'
When this rule is compared with the outcome in E & S Inu. Co.
v. Richland Bowl, Inc., it becomes apparent that the majority
holding is consistent with the rule. This consistency is illustrated
by a diversity case whose facts were strikingly similar to those in
E&S.
At issue in Richman v. Joray Corp.9 were the damages due a
landlord upon the tenant's failure to pay rent for the demised
bowling center. The appellate court awarded the landlord dam-
Richland Bowl lease stipulated an annual rent of $35,200.00.
7. Id. at 594-99, 216 S.E.2d at 528-29.
8. Richman v. Joray Corp., 183 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1950), citing Simon v. Kirkpa-
trick, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E. 614, 54 A.L.R. 1348 (1927); accord, United States Rubber
Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1956).
9. This case was twice appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals; 192 F.2d 660
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ages based on the difference between the original rent and the
lesser rent obtained upon reletting for the remainder of the lease,
plus $200 special damages arising out of the reletting. 10 Unlike
E & S, the landlord in Richman was able to relet the building
permanently as a bowling center, and therefore no structural
modifications were necessary. E & S can be viewed as going one
step past Richman and allowing recovery of modifications. Im-
plicit in E & S, though not stated, is the reservation that such
modifications must be special damages arising from the breach.
As one court has stated, these expenses must be "reasonably
necessary in order to obtain a tenant and mitigate damages.""
The holding in E & S should not be interpreted as a license
for landlords victimized by defaulting tenants to incur large mod-
ification costs and then to shift them off on the former tenant.
First, the modifications must be reasonably necessary in order to
obtain a tenant for the building. Clearly this was the case here.
Three different concerns tried and failed in operating a bowling
center in the building. The only real solution seemed to be modi-
fying the structure for a more efficient use. Second, the modifica-
tions must be a true mitigation of damages; in other words, it
must be cheaper to the defendant for the plaintiff to modify the
building and obtain a new tenant than to rent the building as it
was vacated."2
The theories underlying the above discussion are twofold: (1)
contract damages are designed only to restore the injured party
to the position he would have held had the other party not
breached, 3 and (2) the injured party had an affirmative duty to
10. 192 F.2d 660, 663.
11. Babsdon Co. v. Thrifty Parking Co., 149 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
12. The decision whether to relet the structure as vacated or to make modifications
and then relet must be based on which course leaves the former tenant liable for the least
damages under the original lease.
13. South Carolina Fin. Corp. v. West Side Fin. Co., 236 S.C. 109, 113 S.E.2d 329
(1960); accord, McManus v. Midland Valley Lumber Co., 232 F. Supp. 885 (E.D.S.C.
1964), vacated 348 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1965). See generally 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1002
(1964); 11 W. WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (3d ed. 1968). Determining damages for breach
of commercial leases generally should present fewer problems than with other types of
contracts for the following reasons: (1) a landlord's costs are relatively fixed under the
ordinary lease, (2) a comparison of the rent paid by the new tenant with that paid by the
defendant is usually simple, and (3) documentation of special damages arising out of the
breach should be relatively simple.
Not discussed herein is the argument that special damages were not within the con-
templation of the parties at the time the lease was entered into. See 5 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1010 (1964); 11 W. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1344 (3d ed. 1968). Apparently
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mitigate damages.'4 As has been shown, the majority opinion in
E & S is consistent with these two policies. The dissent, however,
while requiring a mitigation of damages, would have allowed the
injured party to benefit from the breach. By viewing the $49,200
modification expenditure as a separate transaction between
E & S and TG&Y outside the context of the original lease with
Richland Bowl, E & S would have the potential of finding itself
in a better situation than if Richland Bowl had performed its
contract. While arguments justifying this position can be made,"
the dissent's view is generally felt not to be consistent with gen-
eral contract damages law.'8
The court's holding in E & S Inv. Co. v. Richland Bowl, Inc.,
represents a significant precedent in the area of commercial
leases. When read with earlier holdings and general policies un-
derlying contract damages, the case can be viewed as setting forth
the limits of recovery under commercial leases.
II. REAL ESTATE SALES CONTRACTS
Dorman Realty & Insurance Co. Inc. v. Stalvey" addressed
for the first time the question of whether an informal, oral listing
of real property with a realtor gives that realtor the right to collect
his commission if the owner independently obtains a purchaser
for the listed property. The South Carolina Supreme Court held
that, unless the owner clearly intended to give up his right to sell
the property himself, he was deemed to have reserved that right
for himself.'8
The case involved an oral agreement entered into during the
summer of 1970 between the defendant Theta W. Stalvey" and
this defense would be unavailable if the special damages arose under legitimate mitigation
efforts.
14. United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1957);
Burkhalter v. Townsend, 139 S.C. 324, 138 S.E. 34 (1927); Harper v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 133 S.C. 55. 130 S.E. 119, 42 A.L.R. 286 (1926). See generally 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1039 (1964); 11 W. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1353 (3d ed. 1968). Note that the doctrine
of mitigation of damages applies only if the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to avoid
the damages. Williams v. McRae, 168 F. Supp. 650 (W.D.S.C. 1958).
15. It may be argued, for example, that the plaintiff should not be required to spend
his funds for the benefit of the defendant. Then too, the extra compensation can be viewed
as a source to pay the plaintiff's attorney fees and legal costs.
16. See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1041 (1964).
17. 264 S.C. 94, 212 S.E.2d 591 (1975).
18. Id. at 98, 212 S.E.2d at 593.
19. Throughout the relevant transactions Mrs. Stalvey acted through her husband,
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the plaintiff Dorman Realty and Insurance Co. (Dorman). The
agreement provided that Dorman would attempt to obtain a pur-
chaser for a certain 240-acre parcel of Stalvey property in Horry
County. A few weeks after this arrangement was reached, it was
alleged by the defense that Mrs. Stalvey's husband notified Dor-
man's vice-president, T. M. Hendrix, that Mrs. Stalvey herself
would locate a purchaser for the property. At the trial, Hendrix
neither admitted nor denied the conversation."
On September 17, 1970, Mrs. Stalvey sold the property
through her husband to the codefendant Jack Jones. Because
there was uncertainty as to whether a commission was due Dor-
man on the sale and because Jones was eager to complete the
transaction in one day, Jones and Mrs. Stalvey agreed that Jones
would be liable for any commissions due Dorman. The Court of
Common Pleas of Horry County entered a judgment of $12,000
against both defendants.2
On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the appel-
lant22 raised several issues, but the court reached only one issue
in reversing the trial court. The issue addressed by the supreme
court was whether an agreement between a seller of real property
and a realtor was to be deemed an "exclusive sales contract" or
an "exclusive agency contract," when the contract itself was si-
lent on the point. Under an exclusive sales contract, the seller is
liable for the commission to the agent even if the seller himself
obtains a purchaser. Under an exclusive agency contract, how-
ever, the seller is barred from selling through another agent, but
he may still sell the property himself free of any obligation to the
agent.
In ruling that the instant contract was "no more than an
exclusive agency contract for an indefinite period of time," the
supreme court held that
An owner's right to sell his own real estate is inherent and this
right is retained even when a broker is employed, unless the
contract provides in inequivocal terms or by necessary implica-
tion that the owner's right to sell has been relinquished. The
right of an owner to sell his own property is an implicit condition
of every contract of agency unless negatived.?
20. 264 S.C. at 96-97, 212 S.E.2d at 592 (1975).
21. Id. at 97, 212 S.E.2d at 592-93. The judgment represents a ten percent commis-
sion on the sale price of $120,000.
22. Only Jones appealed the judgment of the trial court.
23. 264 S.C. at 98-99, 212 S.E.2d at 593-94.
[Vol. 28
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By way of dictum, the court held that even denominating a writ-
ten contract as an "exclusive sales contract" is not "necessarily
determinative" if the facts do not point to that conclusion. As a
final point, the court noted that the instant agreement had no
more effect than an unaccepted offer or unilateral contract which
could be revoked any time prior to the realtor's accepting the
contract and making it enforceable by selling the property. The
refusal of Hendrix to refute the alleged conversation with Mr.
Stalvey prior to the sale of the land to Jones was viewed by the
court as indicating that the unilateral contract offer had in fact
been cancelled.
24
In deciding this case, the only authority cited by the court
was a detailed annotation. The court expressed preference for
exclusive agency contracts over exclusive sale contracts, reflect-
ing the majority view noted by the annotation.
The basic principle implied by the tenor of virtually all the cases
within [this area] is that the inherent right of an owner of real
property to sell it himself is retained . . . unless the broker's
contract in some way or other imposes liability upon the owner
for such a sale, either expressly or by the grant to the broker of
such exclusive right as the court may deem necessarily implies
such liability.2
The court's reluctance to look merely to the label in determining
the nature of the written real estate broker contract also appears
to reflect the majority rule.
2
1
In finding that the Dorman-Stalvey agreement had no more
effect than an offer or a unilateral contract, the supreme court
gave legal effect to the fact that the agreement involved no con-
sideration. Some authorities have held that the absence of consid-
eration makes such real estate broker contracts unenforceable
until the time the realtor "accepts" the contract by selling the
property.27 Other authorities have held that the realtor's efforts
to procure a purchaser may be sufficient consideration to convert
24. Id. at 98-100, 212 S.E.2d at 594. On September 18, 1970, the day after Jones
purchased the property, Dorman signed a written sales agreement with one J. Watson
Smith.
25. Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 936, 941-42 (1963); accord, 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 94 (1938);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, Explanatory Notes, § 449, comment b at 361-62; Note,
Real Estate Brokers Contracts in South Carolina, 18 S.C.L. REV. 819, 832-33 (1966).
26. See Annot. 88 A.L.R.2d 936, 940-41 (1963).
27. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 50 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,
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the contract to a bilateral one.2 8 South Carolina obviously has
chosen the former view.29 It is interesting to note that both Geor-
gia" and North Carolina' have adopted rules similar to the rule
adopted here.
In Dorman Realty & Insurance Co. v. Stalvey, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has reaffirmed the oft-stated policy that
the law favors the free alienability of land. By establishing a
strong preference for exclusive agency contracts over exclusive
sales contracts and by casting a shadow on the enforceability of
real estate broker contracts which do not include an obvious form
of consideration, the court has protected the owner's ability to sell
his realty free of liability to a realtor. Furthermore, it is arguable
that, with both the owner and the realtor working to sell the land,
the alienability of land is in fact promoted.
Regardless of the effect the case will have on this policy, the
decision certainly will give land owner-sellers greater freedom in
their dealings. To realtors, the case means that informal, oral
broker contracts are very undesirable. Likewise, poorly designed
contracts which purport to be exclusive sales contracts without
sufficient clarity will present problem. In the future, a realtor who
seeks to use an exclusive sales contract form will find it desirable
to use forms which convey the nature of the agreement with abso-
lute clarity. Perhaps boldface statements to this effect or special
collateral agreements to this end will be used to establish the
nature of the contract. Because this issue has been similarly de-
cided in other jurisdictions, existing form books should be of
value to the practitioner drafting such contracts.32
28. Thompson v. Hudson, 76 Ga. App. 807, 47 S.E.2d 112 (1948); 1 A. CoRBIN,
CONTRACTS § 50 (1963); Note, Real Estate Brokers Contracts in South Carolina, 18 S.C.L.
REV. 819, 833 (1966).
29. The supreme court's ruling that the contract was unenforceable is dictum as the
court had earlier ruled that the terms of the alleged contract had not been breached.
Therefore, the issue of whether the contract was enforceable was rendered moot.
30. See Stone v. Reinhard, 124 Ga. App. 355, 183 S.E.2d 601 (1971) and other cases
cited therein; accord, Contract Mgmt. Consultants v. Huddle House, 134 Ga. App. 566,
215 S.E.2d 326 (1975). But see note 12 supra, indicating that Georgia holds a different
view from South Carolina as to realtor sales efforts constituting sufficient consideration
so as to create an enforceable contract.
31. Peeler Ins. & Realty, Inc. v. Harmon, 20 N.C. App. 39, 200 S.E.2d 443 (1973).
32. See, e.g., MODERN LEGAL FORMS § § 8051-57 (1968). Such proposed forms may have
to be modified to call greater attention to the exclusive sales provisions.
[Vol. 28
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In Almers v. South Carolina National Bank of Charleston,33
the South Carolina Supreme Court determined the enforceability
of a pension forfeiture clause in an employment contract which
divests a retired employee of his company-paid pension benefits34
should he subsequently accept employment with a competing
firm. Herbert J. Almer, the plaintiff-appellant, had been em-
ployed by the defendant-respondent South Carolina National
Bank of Charleston (SCN) for 17 years and was fourth in com-
mand upon leaving in 1965. In that same year, Almers was em-
ployed by Southern Bank and Trust Co. in Greenville, S.C. in a
position "substantially the same" as he had left at SCN.
Following Almers' employment with Southern Bank and
Trust Co., SCN terminated Almers' pension benefits which had
been created solely by SCN contributions.15 This action was
based on a restriction in the pension plan stating that an em-
ployee would forfeit his unpaid benefits if, in SCN's opinion, the
former employee accepted other employment in South Carolina
which was competing with or detrimental to SCN. The forfeiture
applied to any subsequent employment with a competitor in
South Carolina without regard to the location in the state or the
length of time the former employee had been separated from
SCN.
Almers brought an action to obtain his pension benefits in
Greenville county court. The Standing Master ruled the restric-
tion invalid, but the county court reversed the Master. Almers
then appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Ness with Justice Littlejohn dissenting, held the pension restric-
tion void as being contrary to public policy. The court adopted
the view that pension covenants divesting otherwise qualified
employees of their benefits if they should work for a competitor
of the former employer were analogous to covenants not to com-
pete and were bound by standards of reasonableness as to the
time and geographical limitations of the restraint. This reasoning
was consistent with a series of South Carolina cases ruling on
33. 265 S.C. 48, 217 S.E.2d 135 (1975).
34. Such employer-paid pension plans are called "non-contributing plans."
35. It was estimated that Almers' benefits would have been worth approximately
$20,000. In the event of forfeiture, these funds would be applied to benefit other members
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covenants not to compete26
The court listed three factors which would be examined to
determine if the forfeiture restrictions were unreasonable: (1)
"the economic injury to the employee," (2) "the practical affect
(sic) of the presence of the forfeiture clause," and (3) the exist-
ence of a "legitimate commercial interest" which may be pro-
tected by an employer."
In determining the economic injury of the forfeiture upon the
plaintiff Almers, the court ruled that the forfeiture was unen-
forceable "if [it] was unduly burdensome or oppressive, tending
to deprive a person of the right to support himself and his fam-
ily."' 38 Expressing the belief that pension forfeiture clauses are
likely to work an extraordinary hardship because retired employ-
ees as a group are ill-prepared to bear the resulting financial loss,
the court held that the economic injury to the plaintiff was too
great.
The court found that the presence of the forfeiture provision
was an effective deterrent to other SCN employees seeking com-
petitive employment. 9 To support this conclusion, the court
noted that Congress had found that forfeiture provisions were
detrimental to the economy."
In analyzing the third and final factor, the court's job was
facilitated by SCN's concession that it had "no valid commercial
interest worthy of protection with a forfeiture clause."', The
court, however, went beyond this concession and observed that
covenants not to compete would be looked upon favorably only
when they served to protect valid business interests, such as good-
will or trade secrets. Because a pension forfeiture clause, unlike
a covenant not to compete, is not specifically enforceable, the
court said that the intent is not to protect these legitimate busi-
36. Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 258 S.C. 429, 189 S.E.2d 22 (1972);
Oxman v. Profitt, 241 S.C. 28, 126 S.E.2d 852 (1962); Oxman v. Sherman, 239 S.C. 218,
122 S.E.2d 559 (1961); Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533
(1961); South Carolina Fin. Corp. of Anderson v. West Side Fin. Co., 236 S.C. 109, 113
S.E.2d 329 (1960). See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv.
L. Rav. 625 (1960); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94 (1955); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955).
37. 265 S.C. at 58, 217 S.E.2d at 140.
38. Id. at 56, 217 S.E.2d at 139. The court borrowed this standard from an earlier
case involving a covenant not to compete. Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C.
54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961).
39. Other authorities refer to this effect as an in terrorem effect.
40. 265 S.C. at 57, 217 S.E.2d at 139. The court here referred to the finding set forth
in 3 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4679 (1974).
41. 265 S.C. at 59, 217 S.E.2d at 140.
[Vol. 28
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ness interests but to restrict competition. This final argument is
most significant, as the court noted:
From this discussion it would seem that the forfeiture provisions
should always be void. Nevertheless, our discussion throughout
this case illustrates that the covenant not to compete and forfei-
ture upon competing are but alternative approaches to accom-
plish the same practical result. Therefore, we would not substi-
tute the reasoning of the pure logician for the realities of the
business world and embark on a separate course of treatment for
covenants not to compete and forfeiture provisions. When
pruned to their quintessence, they tend to accomplish the same
results and should be treated accordingly. 2
Taken alone, the emphasized sentence would indicate that
forfeiture provisions are always unenforceable. However, the re-
mainder of the quotation indicates that pension forfeitures are to
be dealt within the same manner as covenants not to compete,
which are not always unenforceable. This seeming disparity can
perhaps be reconciled by reading the opinion to say that forfeiture
provisions are always anti-competitive and never protect legiti-
mate business interests, while covenants not to compete, in pro-
per instances, can protect legitimate business interests.13 Regard-
less of how this quotation is read, it is clear that pension forfei-
tures are subject to extreme judicial scrutiny in South Carolina.
In explaining its holding, the court rejected a contrary line
of cases from other jurisdictions. These cases had held that forfei-
ture covenants in noncontributory pension plans are valid be-
cause they merely deny the competing former employee his pen-
sion benefits. On the basis of this characteristic they are distin-
guished from covenants not to compete which totally prohibit
42. Id. at 59, 217 S.E.2d at 140 (emphasis added).
43. This view is supported by the court's discussion of the three factors used to
analyze the forfeiture. That discussion did not focus upon the facts peculiar to this case
but rather took note of facts generally applicable to the public. The broad terms used
perhaps indicate that this was a ruling on all pension forfeitures. If this is the court's
holding, this opinion is the most hostile ruling on pension forfeitures in any jurisdiction.
Earlier in its opinion, however, the court said:
... [W]e hold that a forfeiture clause in a profit or pension plan which pro-
vides that upon employment with a competitor a participant is divested of rights
under the plan is invalid unless it contains reasonable time and geographic
limitations.
265 S.C. at 56, 217 S.E.2d at 139.
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competing employment." The leading case of this view is one that
was before Judge Donald Russell in the United States Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Rochester Corp. v. Rochester.5 Under-
lying this line of cases is a belief that competition is not overly
restrained because the former employee is not legally barred from
obtaining competing employment. Rather the former employee
only loses a benefit from the former employer against whose inter-
est the employee has chosen to act.46 Perhaps even more funda-
mental than this is a belief that freedom of contract is a basic
tenet of the law and that, in the absence of a legislative declara-
tion to the contrary, a contract voluntarily entered into by the
parties should be enforced. Justice Littlejohn's dissent in Almers
is an excellent essay supporting this type of judicial restraint.47
Although Judge Russell had claimed in Rochester Corp. v.
Rochester" that the holding therein is the majority rule, the view
adopted by the South Carolina court is well supported by author-
ity. 9 This latter group of cases generally agree with the South
Carolina Supreme Court in finding pension forfeiture clauses
analogous to covenants not to compete and holding that they are
only enforceable when the restraint is reasonable. In addition,
44. Distinguishing the cases in this area as being of one view or another should not
imply that they adopt one or the other of two sets of uniform rules. The converse is true.
As one court has noted, these cases represent a collection of "fractionated postulates." Van
Hosen v. Bankers Trust Co., 200 N.W.2d 504, 505 (Iowa 1972).
45. 405 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying Virginia law). See also Almers v. South
Carolina Nat. Bank of Charleston, 265 S.C. 48, 54, 217 S.E.2d 135, 138, and Food Fair
Stores, Inc. v. Greeley, 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632, 638 (1972). See generally Note,
Contracts: Restraint of Trade: Forfeiture of Pension Rights onAcceptance of Employment
With Competitor, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 673 (1965); Note, Forfeiture of Pension Benefits for
Violation of Covenants Not to Compete, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 290 (1966); Annot. 18 A.L.R.2d
1246 (1968).
46. Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1971). This view also
can be reformulated as holding that the former employee's noncompetitive acts are the
consideration which create pension benefits. Therefore competitive employment causes no
forfeiture; the employee has yet to "earn" any benefit to forfeit. Justice Littlejohn, dis-
senting in Almers, adopts this viewpoint, inter alia. 265 S.C. at 63, 217 S.E.2d at 142.
47. 265 S.C. at 59-63, 217 S.E.2d at 140-42.
48. 405 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1971).
49. See, e.g., Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 398 P.2d 147,
42 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1965); Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1971); Van Hosen v.
Bankers Trust Co., 200 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1972); Food Fair Stores Inc. v. Greeley, 264 Md.
105, 285 A.2d 632 (1972); Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Or. 331, 505 P.2d 342 (1973); Note,
Contracts: Restraint of Trade: Forfeiture of Pension Rights on Acceptance of Employment
with Competitor, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 673 (1965); Note, Forfeiture of Pension Benefits for
Violation of Covenants Not to Compete, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 290 (1966); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d
1246 (1968).
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CONTRACTS
these cases generally have joined South Carolina in observing
that enforcing pension forfeitures often creates a severe financial
hardship on older employees and thus are contrary to the public
policy favoring an economically self-sufficient citizenry. Finally,
several authorities have noted that the presence of the forfeiture
clause in employment contracts will have an in terrorem effect
upon other pension beneficiaries who otherwise might seek com-
petitive employment." As the South Carolina Supreme Court
noted, this produces under-utilization of skilled personnel in the
state.5'
To summarize, in Almers v. South Carolina National Bank
of Charleston, the South Carolina Supreme Court has chosen to
follow a minority, but growing, view in expressing its hostility to
pension forfeitures. However, the exact fate of these forfeitures
continue to remain uncertain under the Almers decision.
Patrick A. Reardon
50. This effect is even more pronounced with pension forfeitures than with covenants
not to compete which require judicial enforcement and often only sanction the offending
employee by court-ordered specific performance. Note, Forfeiture of Pension Benefits for
Violations of Covenants Not to Compete, 61 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 290, 299 (1966), cited with
approval, Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Or. 331, 335, 505 P.2d 342, 344 (1973).
51. These policies perhaps explain why this court and other courts have not sought
to sever unreasonable aspects of pension forfeitures or to rewrite them in a reasonable
fashion. Instead these courts seem to be choosing to excise them whenever possible. At
least one court has discussed severing pension forfeitures. Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Or. 331,
505 P.2d 342 (1973). See Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 258 S.C. 429, 189 S.E.2d
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